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The Evolving Role
of Semiconductor
Consortia in the United
States and Japan
Rose Marie Ham
Greg Linden
Melissa M. Appleyard
S ince the late 1970s, governments throughout the industrializedeconomics have proclaimed the benefits of research consortia. In theUnited States, tor example, ihe 1984 National Cooperative ResearchAct (NCRA) relaxed U.S. antitrust laws to encourage the formation of
research consortia hy firms in the same industry; by the end of 1995, over 575
consortia had heen registered under the NCRA in a variety of industries, includ-
ing automobiles, aerospace, and telecommunications.' Governments in the
United States, Japan, and Western Europe also launched a myriad of cooperative
R&D programs during the 1980s, often providing subsidies to large-scale consor-
tia among firms in "strategic" high-technology industries,^ These policy initia-
tives were fueled by concerns over the competitiveness of domestic firms in
high-technology sectors combined with the perceived advantages of research
consortia'—by banding together in cooperative R&D activities, firms could share
the risks and costs associated with technology generation and thereby compete
more effectively in international markets.
The semiconductor industry has pioneered in these large-scale R&D con-
sortia."' In part, the leading role of this industry in programs establishing R&D
We gratefully acknowledge William J. Spencer (SEMATECH), Frank Robertson (13001), Hrroyoshi
Komi)g (Selete),Taro Okabe (SIRIJ), and other representatives from the semiconductor industry for
shanng their time and insights with us. We also thank David Mowery for his useful comments and
suggestions on earlier versions of this article, Jeff Macher for his assistance in obtaining industry data,
and George Lee of the SEMI trade association for enabling us to attend SEMI conferences on the
300mm wafer transition. Support for this research was provided by the Califorr)\a Management Rewew,
the Darden Foundation (Appleyard). the Alfred P Sloan Foundation (Appleyard and Ham), and the Air
Fon:e Office of Scientific Ftesearch (Ham).The authoi'^ assume full responsibility for any remaining
errors or omissions.
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consortia refleas its high political saliency in the United States, Japan, and West-
ern Europe. Recognizing that semiconductors are critical inputs to a broad base
of electronics, telecommunications, and military-related technologies, govern-
ments have promoted a strong domestic semiconductor industry and a viable
base of domestic firms to supply the tools and materials used in semiconductor
manufaauring. At the same time, these national objectives have had to confront
the global realities of the semiconductor industry: semiconductor manufacturers
have long operated produaion facilities throughout the industrialized world,
and manufacturers and supplier firms are enmeshed in a complex web of
alliances within and across national borders.^
Two of tbe mosi influential higb-technology R&D consortia of the past 30
years were established with tbe aid of public funds to support semiconduaor-
related R&D. During the mid-1970s, the Japanese government, concerned about
the survival of its computer industry in tbe face of market liberalization, estab-
lished tbe Very Large Scale Integration (VLSf) Project to improve domestic capa-
bilities lor manufacturing semiconductor devices used in mainframe computers.*
The VLSI Projea, along with a parallel set of semiconduaor projeas sponsored
by Japan's state-owned telecommunications firm (NTT), was later credited witb
enabling Japanese semiconductor firms to "catcb up' with U.S. firms in tbis
industry.' By tbe mid-1980s, Japanese firms had surpassed U.S. device makers in
tbe worldwide markets for semiconductor memory devices. This rise to domi-
nance of Japanese semiconductor manufacturers ignited debate in tbe United
States over the beallb of tbe U.S. semiconductor industry and the potential
dependence by U.S. defense agencies on Japanese firms for semiconductors used
in military systems. In response, the U.S. govemment and leading U.S. semicon-
ductor manufaaurers launched tbe U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Technol-
ogy (SEMATECH) consortium in 1987 in order to improve the manufacturing
capabilities of domestic semiconductor firms.
This article examines a new chapter in the history of large-scale semicon-
duaor consortia in the United States and Japan. By focusing on two recently
establisbed consortia—tbe Intertiational 300mm Initiative (I300I) in the United
States and Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies, Inc. (Selete) in Japan—
we examine the changing role of governments and private firms in directing
technology development in the semiconduaor industry.^ Unlike the VLSI Project
and SEMATECH consortia, both I300I and Selete have been financed solely by
member compatiies and are working with a global base of supplier firms, appar-
ently heralding a sea change in relations between the semiconductor industry
atid national governments. These consortia also include leading semiconductor
manufacturers from around the world, which refiects the need to spread costs
across a larger number of firms and higblights the new prominence of Taiwanese
and Soutb Korean firms in semiconductor manufacturing.
This article examines the factors that gave rise to these new semiconduc-
tor R&D consortia in the United States and in Japan—namely, the costly conver-
sion to larger silicon wafers that alters many of the industry's manufacturing
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technologies.'* It then discusses the origins and structures of these consortia and
examines the unprecedented level of cooperation among leading semiconductor
manufacturers that is taking place. Although their efforts are still underway, the
consortia have already confronted the difficulties associated with large-scale
collaborative R&D endeavors that involve uncertain technologies and volatile
market forces. The semiconductor industry may be unique in sustaining this
level of industry-wide cooperation, but the lessons from the current semicon-
ductor consortia apply to managers involved in large-scale collaborative ventures
in other technology-intensive industries.
With respect to the role of government, the two consortia highlight diver-
gent trends. 13001 illustrates the political challenges associated with transforming
a domestically oriented, federally subsidized consortium into an institution sup-
ported solely by dues from domestic and foreign firms. By contrast, Selete was
formed in conjunaion with a new wave of government-funded semiconductor
R&D projects in Japan, and the private consortium shares important ties with
these parallel, public-sector initiatives. Despite predictions that the actions of
national governments will be curtailed in an era of global, high-techno logy
firms,'" home-country governments continue to exercise considerable influence
on these private initiatives, as they do in other high-technology sectors.
Nonetheless, the ultimate effects of government initiatives may be more easily
offset or even derailed by the actions of global firms.
The Challenge of Converting to 300mm Wafers
The semiconductor industry has a unique combination of capital- and
research-intensity that, combined with short product life cycles and a rapid pace
of technological change in the industry, magnifies investment risks for firms."
Individual semiconductor investments are quite large, with new factories
(known as "fabs") costing at least $1 billion. At the same time, the pace of semi-
conductor technology development has increased, shortening the useful life of
capital investments. According to an industry executive: "In the mid-80s, a fab
cost about $100 million and had an expected life span of nearly 10 years. Now
we have $1 billion fabs with a life span of only five years."'^
Semiconductor manufacturing processes also are among the most com-
plex in any industry.'* The fabrication of an integrated circuit (also known as a
"chip" or "device") requires more than a hundred steps (such as patterning,
coating, baking, etching) across a range of specialized tool sets. An average fabri-
cation facility in 1997 utilized about 40 different types of equipment, with indi-
vidual tools ranging in price from $100,000 to $7 million.'' The individual
manufacturing steps are often mastered at an experimental rather than a scien-
tific level and are difficult to replicate on different tools or in different facilities.
Such complexity has historically required manufacturers to work ck>scly with
equipment suppliers to improve the performance of each tool.
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In response to the soaring capital costs and risks of semiconduaor manu-
facturing, producers throughout the world have developed an array of strategies,
among the most important of which is interfirm collaboration in R&D and pro-
duction investments. A new challenge has given an additional impetus to these
collaborative trends. Driven by the need to produce increasing numbers of semi-
conductor chips at lower prices, semiconductor manufacturers and their equip-
ment suppliers are now preparing to upgrade their manufacturing methods and
production tools to accommodate 300mm silicon wafers instead of the current
200mm wafer standard.'^ Larger wafers also will more easily accommodate com-
plex chip designs, such as next-generation microprocessors and systems-on-a-
chip, early versions of which may be too large to manufacture economically on
smaller silicon wafers."*
In contrast to previous wafer transitions, the shift from 200mm to
300mm wafers will not be orchestrated by any single firm in the industry, for
two reasons. First, experts estimate the costs and technical challenges associated
with the shift to 300mm wafers to be an order of magnitude greater than those
of previous wafer transitions.'^ The shift to 300mm wafers necessitates a more
radical overhaul of equipment tool sets than was true of previous wafer transi-
tions, and also requires a fundamental alteration in the overall design of fabrica-
tion facilities. For example, 300mm wafers are so large and fragile that they
necessitate a higher level of automation than is used in 200mm fabs, requiring
the development of new interfaces, carriers, and software. The total develop-
ment costs of 300mm tools are likely to exceed $10 billion, far higher than the
roughly $1 billion cost of developing 200mm tools in the early 1980s.'*'
A second and related reason for the lack of single-firm leadership in the
300mm wafer transition is the experiences of Intel and IBM in leading previous
wafer transitions. In each of these transitions, the "lead company" (Intel for the
100-15Dmm transition; IBM led the 150-200mm transition) purchased or pro-
duced test wafers, subsidized equipment development, and guaranteed procure-
ment contracts for production-worthy tools.'^ Representatives of Intel and IBM
report thai the costs of individually leading these transitions (especially the need
to subsidize the development of new equipment whether or not it was eventu-
ally purchased) outweighed the benefits of having first access lo the new capa-
bilities.^" Intel took two years longer than expected to reach full volume
production in its first 150mm fab, and IBM faced similar problems improving the
reliability of its new 200mm tools.^' Such production delays and unanticipated
tool development costs undermined the profitability of being first to manufac-
ture chips on the new wafers.
Since the costs of 'going it alone" with the current wafer transition are so
high and no single firm can fully appropriate the returns from that investment, a
strategy of sharing some of the costs and risks across a large number of firms has
emerged. For the first time in the history of the industry, leading international
device makers developed a uniform set of standards in advance of a major wafer
transition." In setting these standards, device makers hoped to speed tool devel-
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opment and to reduce the costs of obtaining a compatible 300mm tool set for
next-generation fabs. For example, the previous, piecemeal transitions led by
single firms produced a range of incompatible equipment, forcing chip makers to
develop custom mechanical interfaces or limit their choice of suppliers. Ten dif-
ferent carrier systems were used for 200mni wafers, whereas device makers in
the two 300mm consortia have agreed to accept only two carrier systems for
300mm wafers, both of which must be accommodated by suppliers. Finally, the
history of successful collaboration among leading U.S. device makers in manag-
ing joint projects with supplier firms (e.g., under the auspices of SEMATECH)
may have reduced the transaction costs associated with launching a cooperative
wafer conversion initiative.
Consortium-Led Technological Change
By 1996, two consortia had been formed to lead the conversion of the
industry's capital equipment. The U.S.-based International 300mm Initiative
(I300I) consortium, established in late 1995, comprises 13 leading device mak-
ers, including firms from the United States (Intel, Texas Instruments, Motorola,
IBM, AMD, and Lucent Technologies), Europe (STMicroelectronics,'' Philips,
and Siemens), South Korea (Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics, and LG
Semicon), and Taiwan (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation,
TSMC)." A parallel effort was established in Japan, when ten leading Japanese
semiconductor firms (NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, Matsushita,
Sanyo, Oki, Sharp, and Sony) established Semiconductor Leading Edge Tech-
nologies, Inc. (Selete) in early 1996.'^ ' Together, these consortia include more
than 20 leading semiconductor manufacturers that account for most of the
world's chip production (Table 1).
As this membership roster demonstrates, the device makers'—not equip-
ment suppliers—are leading the wafer conversion effort. The ability of leading
manufacturers from around the world to establish joint technical standards and
set goals for a broad base of suppliers is relatively rare, even though buyers are
typically more eager for standards than suppliers, who prefer higher levels of
product differentiation.^^ In this case, the ability of the device firms to dictate the
conversion sciiedule to their suppliers refieas not only the collective market
power of these customers, but also the technical dependence of suppliers on the
device makers.^^ Although other industries, such as autos, also exhibit a close
working relationship between equipment suppliers and their customers, the
complexity of semiconductor process technology has historically required suppli-
ers to look to device makers for technical guidance.^" Device makers often pro-
vide both funding and engineering resources to their suppliers for specific
projects. One U.S. device maker, for example, estimated that it financed approxi-
mately 20 percent of the $15 million cost and nearly 40 percent of the 14,000+
engineering hours associated with a recent unsuccessful equipment modification
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T A B L E I . Founding Members of 13001 and Selete (by nationality and 1995 IC sales)
13001
U.S. Members
I99SIC 1995 Rank in
sales* ($b) world IC sales''
Intel
Texas Instruments
Motorola
IBM
AMD
Lucent
Combined 1995 IC sales
(% of ail US firms'IC sales)
European Members
STMicroeieclconics (llaly/Ffance)
Philips (Netherlands)
Siemens (Germany)
Combined 1995 IC sales
(% of all European firms' IC sales)
Korean and Taiwanese Members
Samsung [liaaionics [S. Koi-eaj
Hyundai Electronics (S. Korea)
IG Semicon, Inc (S. Kore \\
TSMC (Taiwan)
Combined 1995 IC sales
{% of all Korean & Taiwanese firms' IC sales)
13001 Members' total 1995 IC sales
$13.6
$7.8
$ 7,2
$5.7
$ 2.4
$ 1.7
$38.4
(63%)
$ 3.0
$ Z9
$ 2.4
$ 8.3
(78%)
$ 8.2
$ 4.4
$ 3.6
$ 1.4
$17.6
(83%)
$64.3
1
6
7
8
17
24
1
1
13
14
18
S
10
12
25
project. As this example suggests, such huyer-supplier collaboration contains
risks for both parties.^"
Origin and Structure ofI300I and Selete
The structure and R&D operations of both BOOI and Selete have been
influenced by previous successful and unsuccessful large-scale R&D consortia in
the United States and Japan. In particular, the new consortia incorporate key
features of the VLSI Project and SEMATECH consortia: even though member
firms in both I300I and Selete are "horizontal" competitors in the semiconductor
market, these consortia focus on "vertical" projects aimed at ensuring the relia-
bility and compatibility of production tools. Also, like earlier semiconductor con-
sortia, 13001 and Selete need to define a research agenda and design a structure
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T A B L E I . FoundingMember5of 13001 and Selete (continued)
Selete
Japanese Members
1995 IC
*^ ($b)
1995 Rank in
world IC sales'*
NEC
f"fitacf
Toshiba
Mttsubishi_
Fujitsu
Matsushita
Sanyo
Oki
Sharp
Sony
Combined 1995 IC sales
{% of all Japanese firms' IC sales)
$11,0
$ 8.6
$ 8.6
$ 4.4
I 4.0
$ 2.6
$ 2.3
$ 2.0
$ 2.0
J 1,9
$47,4
(91%)
2
3
4
9
11
16
20
21
22
23
Notes:
a. Source; ICE, StatuiA Report on (he/fitegmtedOfaj/[/ndusE;7(Scottsdafe.AZ Integrated OTurt Engineering, Inc. 1997), based on
sales of merchant firms,
b.All but two of the top 25-ranked IC manufacturers joined either i30OI or Selete. Micron Technology, a US. firm ranked I5tJi, was
a founding member of SEMATECH but withdrew from Uie consortium in 199Z National Semiconductor, a U.S. firm ranked 19th.
is a member of both SEMATECH and its newly-fonned intemadonal subsidiary. International SEMATECH. but was not a founding
rrwmber of 13001,
that facilitates, rather than impedes, effective cooperation both among member
firms and between members and participating suppliers. Despile some similarity
in their objectives, 13001 and Selete have devised divergent solutions to these
challenges, which are central to any large-scale cooperative R&D program.
The International 300mm Initiative
The International 300mm Initiative was formally established in late 1995
as the first international subsidiary of the U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing
Technology (SEMATECH) consortium. BOOI started as an 18-monih, $26 million
project (roughly $2 million per member firm). According lo SEMATECH repre-
sentatives, early plans for 13001 included an annual budget as high as $100 mil-
lion, but prospective participants selected a less cosily project. BOOI's activities
have been extended into 1999, and the consortium now receives roughly $24
million per year in dues paid by member firms. 13001 is housed in SEMATECH's
Austin, Texas, facility and rents dean-room space from SEMATECH.*'
The design of 13001 builds direaly on the experience of SEMATECH. First,
I300I adopted SEMATECH's system of employing assignees from member firms
to facilitate the transfer of information back to their parent organizations.
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Approximately 90 percent of BOOI's technical positions are staffed by member-
firm assignees." Second, BOOI employs SEMATECH's cost-of-ownership (COO)
model to establish the basic guidelines and information on equipment cost and
performance." The design and management of BOOI's activities also drew on the
accumulated experience of SEMATECH managers, which may have enabled
13001 to begin its operations more quickly and easily than would have otherwise
been possible.
A third feature of BOOI reflects the lessons of SEMATECH in defining a
research agenda that facilitates cooperation among competing firms. In ihe sec-
ond year of its operation, SEMATECH redirected its research agenda away from
collaborative projects among device makers aimed at improving their manufac-
turing process technologies toward projects between these semiconductor manu-
facturers and their U.S. suppliers of semiconductor equipment and materials.
The main reason for the "vertical" shift was the reluaance of U.S. device makers
to share process technologies with one another that were critical to the market
success of these competing firms.^'' Although this redirection in SEMATECH's
aaivities simplified collaboration among device makers, it created considerable
concern among equipment suppliers over the sharing or leakage of proprietary
information. In response to these concerns, most of SEMATECH's equipment
projects now take place al the facilities of individual supplier lirms instead of the
consortium's common facility, and suppliers generally own any project-related
intellectual property. Consistent with this experience, 13001 has adopted a
decentralized approach to working wilh suppliers and, like SEMATECH, evalu-
ates most equipment at suppliers' sites, using engineers from both BOOI and the
participating supplier firm." This arrangement provides suppliers with immedi-
ate feedback on the performance of their tools and reduces the danger that pro-
prietary information will "leak" among competing suppliers.
Unlike SEMATECH, however, BOOI does not directly fund equipment
development. Although SEMATECH continues to sponsor joint development
and equipment improvement projects with suppliers, BOOI simply evaluates
tools for basic test parameters, leaving the development and subsequent
improvement of those tools to suppliers.'* Given its commitment to tool evalua-
tion rather than development, BOOI does not expect to own any intellectual
property based on its work with suppliers. In contrast, SEMATECH obtained 89
patents between 1989 and 1996 based on research conducted or funded by the
consortium, although the consortium now places less emphasis on owning intel-
lectual property from projeas with suppliers."
Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies, Inc.
The Japan-based Selete consortium is a more ambitious collaborative
R&D program aimed at both the evaluation and development of 300mm tools.
The proposal for Selete was made in 1995 by the Semiconductor industry
Research Institute Japan (SIRIJ), an industry group lormed a year earlier by the
ten largest Japanese chip producers as part of a broader effort to "reactivate
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Japan's semiconductor industry."^^ Together, the members of this industry orga-
nization (NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, Matsushita, Sanyo, Oki,
Sharp, and Sony) accounted for 91 percent of all Japanese firms' IC sales in
1995."
Following some discussion of joining the U.S.-based 300mm efforts, the
ten leading Japanese device makers in SIRU chose to establish a separate consor-
tium in 1996.""* The Japanese participants of Selete committed approximately
$280 million for a five-year 300mm program, an annual budget more than twice
thai of 13001 (and nearly three limes as large on a per-member basis). This larger
R&D budget supports a broader program of collaboration and defrays a higher
share of the costs associated with 300mm equipment evaluation and develop-
ment, incurred primarily by suppliers in 13001. For example, unlike 13001, Selete
pays the full cost of the expensive test wafers used in the equipment
evaluations."' Selete also established a dedicated clean-room facility in Hitachi's
Production Engineering Research Laboratory and purchased test equipment for
this facility.''^  BOOI's rented facility does not house an entire production line and
its test equipment is either under evaluation or donated by suppliers.
Yet another notable difference between Selete and 13001 is Selete's greater
centralization. In contrast to I300L equipment is typically evaluated in Selete's
central laboratory rather than in suppliers' facilities. Evaluations arc primarily
performed by Selete engineers on assignment from member firms. Tool perfor-
mance is communicated to the supplier in a weekly report that may include
suggestions for improvements in the tool. Originally, all of the tools were evalu-
ated at the central Selete facility. As the early experience of SEMATECH sug-
gests, however, the risk of technology leakage among supplier firms may
increase when tool-related projects are conducted in a common facility.'^  Recog-
nizing the need to ensure confidentiality to suppliers, Selete established tempo-
rary barriers between similar tools under evaluation at Selete. Selete also
modified its original structure and is evaluating some equipment at suppliers'
facilities.""*
In addition to evaluating equipment, Selete also develops and modifies
300mm tools, in contrast to the 13001 consortium where suppliers are solely
responsible for improving and developing their tools. From its inception, Selete
has been committed to generating jointly owned intellectual property based on
improvements suggested by Selete engineers to the tools under evaluation."^^ As
of mid-April 1998, Selete had finished ten evaluations and was in the process of
conducting about 30 more. By the end of fiscal year 1998, the group expects lo
apply for 10 to 20 patents, most of which would be jointly owned by Selete and
individual equipment suppliers.'"'
Discussion
The key differences between T300I and Selete are summarized in Table 2.
Selete evaluates tools for a longer time period (up to nine months, versus a 6-
month maximum at 13001) and in a centra! facility that includes all the elements
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TABLE 2. Key features ofl300l and Selete
International
300nnm Initiative
(13001)
Semiconductor Leading
Edge Technologies, Inc.
(Selete)
Founding Members 6 US. firms
3 European firms
3 Korean firms*
I Taiwanese firm
10 Japanese firms''
Location
Date Established
Budget(annual average)
Staff size (approx.)
Primary evaluation site
Type of tests
Guidance In
technolog/ development
Generation of
Intellectual Property?
Austin.Tx. USA
(SEMATECH clean room)
November 1995
$24 million
68
suppliers' facilities
and 13001 clean room
unit processes
Indirect
No
(supplier-owned)
Yokohama Crty, Japan
(Hitachi Laboratory)
February 1996
$56 million (¥7 billion)
ISO
central Selete clean room
short loops
Direct
Yes
(both Selete-owned and Selete-
supplier-owned anticipated)
Notes:
a, Samsung Eleciromcs Co. and LGSemicon, Inc. terminated their membership in 13001 at the end of 1997 ("Samsung Stays in
japan's 300mm Group After Leaving SEMATECH's." Electronic Buyers' News DCJJ^ Digest. February 4.1998).
b. Samsung affveti to participate in Selete in 1997, but is not a stockholder of the consortium.
of a full fabrication line. Selete also does more comprehensive electrical testing
of device substructures ("short loops") based on a fully specified process "recipe,"
which helps assess the performance of a tool when it is integrated with other
production steps. By contrast, I300I is limited to "demonstrations" of tool perfor-
mance ("unit processes"), many of which are conducted at supplier sites, and its
clean-room facility is primarily used for technical support and wafer inspection.
These and other differences have contributed to difficulties over sharing of test
resuhs between the two consortia."'
The two industry consortia have also established very different vertical
relationships with supplier firms. Selete is more heavily involved in the develop-
ment of production equipment, and its participating device makers have agreed
to jointly fund a larger share of the development costs associated with the
300mm wafer transition. But in contrast lo the VLSI Project and SEMATECH
consortia of previous decades, these privately funded inilialives arc unencum-
bered by any explicit government directive to improve the health of a domestic
base of suppliers. They are pursuing a more "open" policy of evaluating tools
from suppliers worldwide. For example, a leading Japanese supplier. Canon,
shipped a 300mm lithography system for testing at the U.S.-based 13001 consor-
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tium in 1997, and other leading suppliers from the United Stales and Europe are
participating in the demonstration activities of both consortia."* By mid-1998,
I300I and Selete had evaluated tools from vendors worldwide. Roughly 60 per-
cent of tools evaluated by Selete were from Japanese firms, while slighdy more
than 50 percent of the tools evaluated by 13001 were from U.S. firms.''''
Despite their differences, I300I and Selete have encountered similar prob-
lems during the past 18 months, many of which are attributable to the technical
and managerial complexity of the 300mm wafer transition. First, inu al! suppli-
ers have provided their equipment prototypes on schedule. Production-ready
300mm tools are still unavailable for some key processing steps, whicli prevents
manufacturers from implementing a complete 300mm manufacturing process.
For example, Texas Instruments has constructed a new fab, which is sitting
empty until a complete set of 300mm tools is available.^" To address this prob-
lem, SEMATECH is weighing a proposal to begin a program in 1999 (led by
13001) to develop tools in the lagging 300mm equipment areas. A related issue is
whether suppliers will adhere to the standards. I300I members have repeatedly
announced that they will demand tools from suppliers that meet the standards
set by the consortia, but it is far too soon to know if this will occur in practice.
Some companies may continue to demand customized, non-compliant tool sets
from equipment suppliers in order to optimize the performance of specific steps
for their product lines.^'
Two other unexpected factors have delayed the 300mm conversit)n
efforts. First, fastcr-than-expected reductions in ihe line widths of circuit pat-
terns have permitted more chips to fit onto each 200mm wafer, extending ihc
productive life of 200mm fabs and equipment. Suppliers have also realized that
some productivity enhancements, such as mini-environments, which were
expected to enter the mainstream only with the 300tiim generation, can be
deployed in 200mm fabs. As a result, the early introduction of next-generation
300mm tools is now less critical than was previously thought."'^ Second, the
industry downturn that began in 1997 has made manufacturers reluctant to
invest in tools for new facilities when their existing labs are underutilized. The
Asian financial and economic crisis exacerbated the effects of the industry down-
turn on equipment firms by further constraining the capital expenditures of
Japanese, Korean, and (more recently) Taiwanese companies.
This combination of technical and economic tactors has delayed the tran-
sition to 300mm wafers. As recently as November 1997, chip makers were pre-
dicting that seven 300mm pilot lines would be operational in 1998 and that the
first high-volume fabs would appear in 2000. As of 1998, however, no 300mm
pilot lines are running and high-volume production Is nol expected uniil 2002.^'
For chip makers, the industry downturn and delays in the current wafer
transition have highlighted the benefits of collaboration. The risk-sharing
arrangement has functioned as planned, with no single firm suffering dispropor-
tionate losses. Nevertheless, the downturn has different near-term implications
for Selete and 13001. The device manufacturers participating in 13001 have
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largely avoided significant expenditures for the joint development of a new gen-
eration of capital equipment whose adoption now seems likely to be delayed.
Seleif members, on the other hand, have incurred more significant costs.
Although some interviewees in 1997 had predicted that Selete's centralized,
"hands-on" design would permit Japanese semiconduaor firms to launch
300mm fabs before their U.S. counterparts, Selete members now are saddled
wilh the considerable expense of operating a full 300mm dean room in the face
of a lack ol demand for this icchnology.
The consequences of the industry downturn on the 300mni transition
have been more severe for supplier firms. Ironically, equipment firms who made
the greatest effort to comply with the original timetable, having spent $25 mil-
lion or more to develop each tool, are worse off than those who failed to respect
the manufacturers' schedules. These early developers are now unlikely to find
significant sales until 2002 or beyond." In light of continued uncertainty over
the timing for an industry upturn, many suppliers have scaled back their
300mm plans. The chip makers in 13001, which has shifted virtually all of these
risks to suppliers, have responded by calling a series of summit meetings with
suppliers to reduce some of the uncertainty they face in their 300mm tool devel-
opment efforts.
This sudden change in the market outlook for 300mm technologies illus-
trates an insufficiently appreciated risk of industry-wide collaboration in envi-
ronments characterized by fundamental uncertainty, which accurately describes
most high-technology industries. The formulation of an industry-wide "vision"
or technology "roadmap" may increase, rather than reduce, the risks that
unforeseen developments will render the best-laid plans irrelevant." Timing is
difficult in any rapidly changing environment. But the tendency of such indus-
try-wide collaboration io concentrate technological or economic bets may
increase the collective exposure of firms to unexpected developments.
Global Firms, National Governments
The efforts of 13001 and Selete are still underway, and their long-range
outcomes and effeas cannot be forecast with confidence. This uncertainty
notwithstanding, the formation and operation of these ventures indicates an
unprecedented level of cooperation within and across national borders in prepa-
ration for the conversion of the semiconductor industry's capital equipment to
new 300mm wafers. The U.S.-based 13001 progiam represents the first time that
leading semiconductor firms from seven countries have agreed to conduct joint
projects on their manulacturing technologies under one organizational
umbrella, and these firms are coordinating some of their efforts with the Japan-
based Seiete consortium. Moreover, both 13001 and Seiete are evaluating tools
from a global base of equipment and materials suppliers. Ahhough device mak-
ers have long been engaged in a complex web of bilateral alliances and have
purchased tools from specialized suppliers from around the world, this relatively
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high level of international cooperation among such a broad base of competing
manufacturers is without parallel in the history of this and other capital-inten-
sive, politically-charged industries {e.g., automobiles or aerospace).
Do these private initiatives support the view that the role of national gov-
ernments is greatly curtailed in an era of international, liigh-technology firms?'*
Not necessarily. On the one hand, BOOI suggests that the role of government in
these industry-wide efforts is diminishing—with the end of federal funding, this
offshoot of the SEMATECH consortium was able to include non-U.S. firms as full
members and as participating suppliers. Selete, however, provides weaker sup-
port for this view. The Japanese consortium coincides with a new wave of gov-
ernment-funded semiconductor R&D initiatives in Japan. As discussed below,
some of these publicly funded projects were designed to complement those con-
ducted by the private consortium, and several are physically located at Selete's
clean-room facility.
Cutting Public Ties: The International Expansion of SEMATECH
One of the most significant changes in the historic ties between semicon-
ductor research consortia and national governments is illustrated by the interna-
tional expansion of SEMATECH and the formation of BOOI." From 1987-1996,
SEMATECH received over $850 million in dues from its members, leading U.S.
semiconductor manufaaurers, and roughly $850 million in matching funds
from the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.'^ '* Although the
industry-government partnership was planned to last from 1987-1992, federal
contributions continued for an additional four years. By ihe mid-1990s, how-
ever, improvements in the health of the U.S. semiconductor industry and its
domestic supplier base coincided with a shift in Congressional attitudes to a
more skeptical view of programs aimed at assisting industrial sectors such as
semiconduaors." Federal funding of SEMATECH ceased in 1996.
With federal funds drawing to an end, SEMATECH faced a choice
between scaling back its research agenda or attracting additional dues-paying
members. In the end, it did both. In 1995, SEMATECH began reducing its oper-
ating budget to prepare for the end of federal funding and initiated plans for
including non-U.S. firms in a set of international projects. In this context, one of
BOOI's most significant accomplishments to date may be its role in paving the
way for an expansion of SEMATECH. In 1998, the remaining members of BOOI
joined a new, more ambitious "International SEMATECH" (see Table 3), another
subsidiary of SEMATECH. Assignees of firms from seven countries will work on
a set of joint International SEMATECH projects, including the continued 300mm
activities of BOOI, a larger project on photolithography (one ol the most critical
technologies used in semiconductor manufacturing), and two other projeas on
manufacturing methods and environmental, safety, and health standards.'^" In
1999, BOOI (now a division of International SEMATECH) expects to phase out
its tool evaluation activities and take on the more difficult task of selecting tools
for joint development or improvement projects.'''
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T A B L E 3 . Members of SEMATECH, International SEMATECH, and 13001
Original
SEMATECH
International Original
SEMATECH 13001
New
13001
AMD
Digital Semiconductor
Hev '^lett Packard
IBM
Intel
Lucent (AT&T)
Motorola
National Semicon.
Rockwell
Texas Instruments
Harris Semiconduetor'
LSI Logic"
Micron Technology'
AMD
Digital Semiconducior
t-lewlett Packard
IBM
Intel
Lucent
Motorola
National Semicon,
Rockwell
Texas Instruments
Hyundai (S Korea)
Philips Semicon.
(Europe)
Siemens (Eunope)
STM icroelectronics
(Europe)
TSMC (Taiwan)
AMD
IBM
Intel
Lucent
MotonDia
Texas Instruments
Hyundai (S. Korea)
Philips Semicon.
(Europe)
Siemens (Europe)
STM icroelectronics
(Europe)
• ' [ • • • - [ , , V . . . : .
LG Semicon (S. Korea)"^
Samsung (S. Korea)'^
AMD
Digital Semiconductor^
Hewlett Packard
IBM
Intel
Lucent
Motorola
National Semicon.
Rockwell
Texas Instruments
Hyundai (S. Korea)
Philips Semicon.
(Europe)
Siemens (Eurape)
STMicroelectronics
(Eurc^)
Notes: aWrttidrew from SEMATtCH in 1993
b. Withdrew from SEMATECH in 1992
c.Witiidrew frDm 13001 in 1997
d.Acquired by Intel in May 1998
Sources: SEMATECH; modified from Global 300 mm Pepon June 1998.
This international expansion of SEMATECH created some political con-
cerns among its former supporters in the federal govemment. Although SEMAT-
ECH's government funding had ended, its plans to include European, Taiwanese,
and Korean firms in its research programs raised concerns in Washington that
the body of manufacturing knowledge created by SEMATECH over the past
decade with the aid of federal monies would "spill over" to non-U.S. firms.
Executives at SEMATECH adopted several procedures to allay these political
concerns. For example, the foreign companies participating in International
SEMATECH must obtain written permission from SEMATECH in order to use
unpublished technical data generated by SEMATECH members with past federal
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assistance. In addition, foreign members of the consortium were not guaranteed
the right to license SEMATECH patents and must obtain written approval for use
of these inventions. '^^
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that SEMATECH's international offshoot
includes no Japanese semiconductor firms. Given the fact that SEMATECH's
original objectives were to improve the competitiveness of U.S. semiconductor
manufacturers relative to their Japanese competitors, Japanese membership in an
international subsidiary (if SEMATECH may well have been politically infeasible.
At a minimum, the inclusion of Japanese device makers in International
SEMATECH would have increased the intensity of the political criticism.**
Renewed Industry-Government Partnerships in Japan?
The Japanese-led Selete consortium illustrates a very different relation-
ship between the private consortium and public-sector initiatives. Selete is one
of several important Japanese semiconductor projects that have been launched
in the past few years. Collectively, these projects represent the largest set of pri-
vate-public programs aimed at semiconductor technologies since the well-
known VLSI Project of the 1970s.*'"* Organizational walls divide the private
initiatives from public ones within this collection of projects. Nonetheless, the
origins and broader research agenda of Selete are enmeshed with important
semiconductor projects funded by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), even though Selete's 300mm program is funded and led
entirely by private finns.
In the early stages of Selete's establishment, the ten Japanese device mak-
ers (in the SIRIJ industry group) sought government funding for two broad
areas of collaborative R&D—300mm evaluation and development, and five
other semiconductor projects aimed at refining and developing more advanced
manufacturing technologies. After reviewing the SIRU proposal, MITI agreed to
fund the latter set of semiconductor projects as part of a new consortium, the
Association of Super-advanced Electronics Technologies (ASET).*"^  ASET was
launched in early 1996, and received $100 million from MITI during the first
year of its operation (see Table 4).*'^  Separately, SIRU members established a
parallel 300mm program in the privately funded Selete consortium.
The common origins of Selete and the semiconductor projects of ASET
are reflected in the complementary design of the two research endeavors.''^ Dur-
ing the first two years of its operations, for example, ASET rented clean-room
space from Selete. Two of ASET's semiconductor projects (in advanced lithogra-
phy) were physically located at Selete's central facility and were run by members
of Selete. Finally, in 1997, the results of one ot ASET's capstone semiconductor
projects (in ArF lithography) were transferred to Selete for continued
development.^*
The renewed partnership between Japanese device makers and the
Japanese government is not, however, a simple replay of the past. Most notably,
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T A B L E 4 . An Overview of Major and Recent Semiconductor Consortia
in the United States and Japan
Consortium Years
Average Annual
Budget (current $)'
Percent
Public Funds
VLSI Project 1976-86
(Government funds
ended in 1980)
$70 million (FY 1976-79)
$40 million (FY 1980-86)
1976-79:40%
1980-86:0%
SEMATECH
13001
1987-present
(Government funds
ended FY 1996)
1996-present
$200 million (1988-94)
$180 million (1995-96)"
$160 million (1997-98)^
$24 million
1988-94:50%
1995-96:50%
1997-98:0%
0%
International
SEMATECH
(tncl. 13001)
1998-present $7S million
(April-December 1998)
0%
Selete 1996-p[-esent $56 million
ASET 1996-present $70 million (of which
approximately 80% is
semiconductor-related)
100% (firms pay
indirect costs only)
Notes;
a. Budget estimates are derived from the following sources: for VLSI Project see Flamm, {MismanagedTrade? op.cit): for
SEMATECH. 13001, and International SEMATECH. see SEMATECH (1997. op.cit) plus personal communicabon; for Selete. see
Selete (1997, op, ciL). for ASFT see ASET (1997. op, ctt) and personal communication,
b, 1996 budget includes 13001
c 1997 budget includes 13001: 1998 includes International SEMATEOi
the Japanese semiconductor firms played a guiding role in orchestrating the
publicly funded ASET project. During Japan's "catch up" phase in ihc 1970s,
MITI and NTT (then a state-owned telecommunications firm) provided much of
the impetus for the creation of the VLSI Project and its parallel projects with
suppliers.^'' As Japan entered the 1980s, however, the ability of the government
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T A B L E 4, An Overvievi' of Major and Recent Semiconductor Consortia
in the United States and Japan (continued)
Consortium Member Firms Suppliers Primary Activities
VLSI Project Rve Japanese device makers: (NEC. Japanese
Fujitsu, HitachiToshiba, Mitsubishi) only
R&D on device, pnxess.
materials, packaging, design,
and test technologies needed
for million-transistor chips
SEMATECH
13001
Intemationai
SEMATECH
(ind. 13001)
Ten U.S.-based device makers (as of
1997); {AMD, Digital H-R IBM Intel,
Lucent. Motorola. National, RockwellTI)
Mainly U.S. Current Technology Areas;
interconnect front end processes,
assembly and packaging, design
systems, manufacturing methods.
Original members: 6 SEMATECH
members + 3 Korean. I Taiwanese.
3 European firms; in 1998. includes all
members of Intemationai SEMATECH
(see Table 3)
Global Standards, 300mm tool evaluation
All 10 SEMATECH members +
I Korean, I Taiwanese, 3 European
Hrms (seeTable 3),
Global Standards, 300mm tool
development lithography,
environmental, heahh & safety
Selete Ten Japanese device makers; (NEC,
Hitachi,Toshiba, M'rtsubishi, Fujitsu,
Matsushita, Sanyo. Oki. Sharp, Sony)
Global 300mm tool evaluation and
development, advanced
technology development
(lithography, computer-aided
design)
ASFT 16 members of semiconductor proj-
ects; 10 Selete members + 4 Japanese
equipment firms (Advantest,jEOL Ltd.
SPC Electronics,Toshiba Machine Co.)
+ I Japanese government lab (NTT-AT)
+ I Japanese subsidiary of a U.S. firm
lTexa5 Instruments)
Japanese 6 semiconductor R&D pnsjects:
only 3 in lithography. I in mask fabri-
cation, I in diagnostics, I in
particle control and cleaning
(the only semiconductor project
including non-Japanese firm)
to implement an effective Industrial policy in the electronics industry declined.
The success of Japanese fimis translated into larger corporate R&D budgets and
"increasingly confident Japanese firms cast off their dependence on MITI and
refused to contribute funds to MITI consortia."'" During the 1980s, a second
shift occurred in MlTl-sponsored projects with high-technology firms: MITI redi-
rected its joint projects with industry away from the "catch uji" programs aimed
at improving existing technologies developed in the United States and toward
projeas that would advance the technological frontier/' The result was that
MITI's two major R&D efforts in the electronics and information technology
seaors in the 1980s, the Supercomputer and Fifth Generation projects, focused
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on long-term R&D, faced resistance by companies, were hamstrung by small
budgets, and ultimately were not very successful.'^
Within this context, the creation of Seleie and ASET represents a new era
of private-public collaboration in Japan, triggered by the first major challenge to
the competitive performance of Japanese device makers since the 1970s. Rather
than being coerced into collaboration, which was the case in the 1970s, leading
Japanese semiconductor firms initiated the latest round of cooperation. Needless
to say, in the absence of a competitive crisis in the Japanese semiconductor
industry, it is unlikely that projects of this magnitude would have been
launched.
Conclusion
Although the competitive performance of semiconductor firms in the
global market is driven by a complex array of macroeconomic, technological,
and institutional influcnces,^^ the two newly formed semiconductor consortia
examined here—the U.S.-based International 300mm Initiative and the Japan-
based Selete consortium—are closely tied to the historic ebbs and flows in ihe
relative performance of U.S. and Japanese firms. The formation of I300I coin-
cided with a period of relative strength for U.S. semiconductor manufacturers
and the domestic base of suppliiT firms. Perhaps as a result, BOOI's members
were reluctant to fund a major development project, settling for a less ambitious
set of activities aimed at setting standards and demonstrating tool performance.
However, the importance of I30DI extends beyond its relatively narrow ro!e in
ihe 300mm wafer conversion. I300I has already been an important experiment
of international collaboration for its parent organizalion, SEMATECH—which,
having shed its partnership with the U.S. government in 1996, created a new
"International SEMATECH" in 1998.
By contrast, the Japan-based Selete consortium was established at a time
when leading Japanese device makers were engaged in efforts to reactivate the
Japanese industry in order to address their collective problems in worldwide
semiconductor markets. In the i990s, Japanese device makers lost market share
to South Korean and Taiwanese firms in commodity product lines (e.g., DRAMs)
that depend on manufacturing expertise and high-volume production. At the
same time, Japanese firms have failed to make significant inroads in the lucra-
tive, design-intensive end of the market (e.g., microprocessors) that remains
dominated by U.S. firms. In response, Japanese semiconduaor manufacturers
launched an ambitious program aimed at improving next-generation manufac-
turing technologies based on the new wafer standard, and did so in conjunction
with a large, publicly funded initiative, ASET.
From this perspeaive, the formation of Selete and ASET is analogous to
the establishment of the U.S. SEMATHCH consortium in the 1980s and Japan's
VLSI Project in the preceding decade: periods of "collective crisis" have resulted
in "collective action" that involves industry-wide coordination and, periodically,
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joint government-industry action in both nations' semiconductor industries. The
critical nature of semiconductor components as inputs to the electronics,
telecommunications, and computer industries means that governments are
reluctant to ignore the erosion in the competitive performance of their domestic
firms, while firms appear more likely to turn to governments during times of
economic strain. At a minimum, this tendency suggests that a truly "borderless"
world of global firms, one in which national governments exercise little or no
influence, remains a distant mirage.
The lingering role of governments in shaping private sector collaboration
is only one of several lessons from these consortia. A key difference between
both I300I and Selete and the landmark semiconductor consortia of the past
(i.e., SEMATECH and the VLSI Project) is that these new initiatives have been
devised and funded by private firms; any government influence on the structure
and design of these consortia was indirect. As such, these industry consortia
yield imponant insights concerning the private incentives for collaboration
among firms in this industry. The semiconductor industry appears to be unique
in the extent to which leading manufacturers are now working together world-
wide to establish uniform standards for manufacturing technologies. The com-
plexity and costs of semiconductor manufacturing, combined with the short
product life cycles and rapid pace of technological change in this industry, have
triggered an unprecedented level of collaboration among device makers in guid-
ing the industry's conversion to 300mm wafers.'' Furthermore, without the
direct involvement of governments in their collective activities, both of these
consortia chose to include a broad base of suppliers from around the world in
their venical projects.
A more cautionary lesson from these privately held consortia is that even
in the face of unprecedented cooperation, the transition to a new technology
(300mm wafers in this case) may be impeded by unforeseen events. The recent
industry slowdown and the faster-than-expected improvements in 200mm fabs
have delayed the need to introduce 300mm tools. As noted earlier, this situation
illustrates an important risk associated with the colleaive priority-setting and
technological forecasting of industry-wide consortia. By the summer of 1998,
what was once called "collaboration" was deemed a "crisis," as supplier firms
found it difficult to support their investments in 300mm tools when purchase
dates slipped further into the future.
The projects at I300I and Selete are still underway. Whether these consor-
tia will be remembered for ushering in a new era of international cooperation
among semiconductor manufacturers and their suppliers, or for contributing to
its demise, remains to be seen.
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